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Book Reviews
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.
By Walter Wheeler Cook. Cambridge. Harvard University
Press, 1942. Pp. xx, 473. $5.00.
In this volume the late Walter Wheeler Cook has collected the ten articles on conflict of laws which he contributed to legal periodicals from 1919 to 1942. To this
series he has added eight unpublished papers which,
though generally sketchier in content than the published
essays, increase materially the usefulness of the book. The
law review articles are printed substantially unchanged,
but corrections or modifications have been made by means
of footnotes, and some essays have been enlarged by the
addition at the end of "Supplementary Remarks, 1942."
Cook's influence on the past two generations of law
teachers and students was considerable. He taught at
many institutions-Nebraska, Missouri, Wisconsin, Chicago, Yale, Columbia, Northwestern-and was one of the
founders and director of the ill-fated Law Institute of the
Johns Hopkins University. His course on scientific method
in the law was always marked by the attendance of law
professors. His greatest prominence was achieved as a
leader, together with Karl N. Llewellyn and Jerome Frank,
of the realist school of jurisprudence, which insists upon
the study of law as it actually operates in society. He
believed, as he made clear in his Commemoration Day
Address at the Johns Hopkins University in 1927, that
the method of the historical school, with its emphasis on
the genesis of legal rules, and that of the analytical school,
with its stress upon the logical consistency of legal rules,
could never lead to an adequate grasp of law as an instrument of social control. In this approach he was helped
by his early training as a mathematical physicist and by
the attention which he gave to the modern developments
of logic.
It is necessary to emphasize Cook's concern with
scientific method, inasmuch as he himself regarded his
employment of the method in the field of conflict of laws
as his principal contribution to that vexed domain. His
two primary assumptions are that scientific method, as
exemplified in physics, chemistry, and biology, is available
for use in the solution of legal problems, and that the
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method can also be utilized in the development of a theory
of value. In the preface to the present volume he expressly disclaims any intention of presenting a complete
treatise on the conflict of laws. His declared object is
to analyze some of the common problems of the field
through the instrumentality of scientific method. In the
main, Cook's expositions of scientific method follow the
analyses of Dewey; but the implications of the preface
and the first chapter that the analysis as a whole turns on
the discoveries of modern logic are not borne out by the
book. Only five of the eighteen chapters that comprise
the work take their point of departure from expressly
articulated logical premises, and the logical assumptions
of all the chapters are for the most part founded on the
traditional Aristotelian logic. However, this is not meant
as a minimization of the significance of the volume. Cook's
regard for the achievements of scientific method led him
to a critical analysis of the presuppositions of conflict of
laws, as it had been currently expounded, and resulted
in a reformulation of some of its traditional attitudes.
Cook was content to call his specific brand of scientific
method "scientific empiricism". In essence, he held it to
represent a fusion of the formerly distinct methods of
logic and experimental inquiry, in which the methods of
observation, hypothesis, deduction, and experiment were
combined. As a good realist he adopted the Holmesian
position that law is the prophecy of what courts will do
in fact; and as a scientific empiricist he repudiated the
idea that the basic principles of conflict of laws could be
determined merely by study and reflection, and that the
soundness of particular rules could be tested by reference
to such principles. He initiated his inquiry by investigating what courts actually do, as distinguished from the
descriptions they give of the reasons for their actions.
He concluded that the vested rights theory of Dicey, and
above all Beale's territorial theory, could not be supported
by the results of such an investigation. Their apparent
simplicity is delusive and they "prove upon consideration
to lead to inconsistencies and complexities, and that what
seems at first sight a more complex and less natural approach turns out in the end to bring us the only true
simplicity-a statement which as clearly and accurately
as possible summarizes observed data and so arranges and
relates them that they can function as aids in dealing with
future experience." Cook's own conclusion was that in
the conflict cases a court never enforces foreign rights,
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but only rights created by its own law; that these rights
are, however, as nearly homologous as possible to those
created by the foreign law. He is at pains to show that
the difference between the application of foreign law or
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign-created right
on the one hand, and the application of domestic law and
the enforcement of a domestic-created right on the other,
is not a difference merely of words. The two ways of
stating the matter lead to differences of result in the actual
decision of cases. At this point the question naturally
arises, how are conflicts cases to be decided if the answer
cannot be deduced from the principles relating to jurisdiction? Cook thinks the only permissible answer is, by
the same methods actually used in deciding cases involving
purely domestic torts, contracts, property and other
matters.
These views have been the subject of extensive debate
and criticism since they were first put forward. During
the period of the preparation of the Restatement they were
advanced with vigor; but the Reporter for the Restatement
was Professor Beale, who not unnaturally preferred his
own views, and notwithstanding some assistance from the
Council of the American Law Institute, the theories of
Professor Beale triumphed in the Restatement's final form.
Not the least valuable aspect of the present volume are the
pungent commentaries which pervade its pages on the apparent illogicalities of the Restatement.
In spite of Cook's emphasis on the importance of scientific method, it must not be supposed that the volume is
merely an exercise in logic. Altogether it represents a
strenuous effort, by one of the remarkable minds in the
legal field in our time, to throw light on some of the
difficult problems which appear in what is perhaps the
most obscure domain of legal thought. The late Mr. Justice Cardozo once remarked to Cook that "the average
judge, when confronted by a problem in the conflict of
laws, feels almost completely lost, and, like a drowning
man, will grasp at a straw." It was Cook's object to indicate at least the direction in which land lay. Sometimes
in the present volume he forgets his own purposes and
clutches at straws himself. Thus, in the chapter on domicil he insists that the theory of the Restatement that every
person has at all times one domicil, and no person has
more than one domicil at a time, is erroneous. He is influenced here by the criticism in logic of the belief that
there can be only one true or correct definition of any
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object. He therefore stresses the fact that it would be
extraordinary if the word "domicil" had been given the
same meaning by courts in the different fields in which
it is employed-taxation, domestic relations, intestacy and
so on. He cites a Massachusetts case in which a divorce
was allowed the wife in spite of a tenuous showing that
the husband was domiciled in the state, a statutory requirement that had to be satisfied. Cook then supposes that
the former husband is sued in another action when physically out of the state, and constructively served in an
attempt to recover a personal judgment. Of course, the
service is valid if the husband is domiciled in the state.
According to the principle of the Restatement the court
must allow the service unless it is to repudiate the divorce
decision. But Cook is sure that on the facts shown the
court would not permit constructive service, and he therefore concludes that the proposition of the Restatement is
in error. However, this is supposed, and Cook cites no
case in support of his position. Moreover, it would not
be difficult, on the basis of the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, to extricate the Massachusetts court
from the apparent dilemma in which Cook has placed it.
A court which has quashed the indictment of a bootlegger
on the ground that the year of the offense was not specified
as being A. D. or B. C., thus apparently putting the defendant in grave doubt as to when he was held to have
committed the offense, could dispose of such a matter even
without the benefit of argument. Such lapses into pure
logicism on Cook's part, however, are rare. No one in
recent years has been more insistent upon keeping the
human equation to the forefront in all legal studies. That
element in his attitude toward legal doctrines, when
coupled with his assiduous development of a sound scientific method, made him the significant figure he was.
HUNTNGTON CAIRNS. *
* Formerly of the Baltimore City Bar; Secretary, Treasurer and General
Counsel, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D. C.
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TRAFFIc CouRTs. By George Warren. Boston. Little,
Brown and Co., 1942. Pp. 245.
This excellent book, published under the joint auspices
of the National Conference of Judicial Councils and the
National Committee on Traffic Law Enforcement, should
be of interest not only to lawyers and those charged with
the enforcement of traffic laws, but also to the increasing
numbers of thoughtful persons who, recognizing the seriousness of the accident situation, have grown to "resent
and ridicule an outrageous system of traffic law enforcement which violates almost every American principle of
justice and equity".
The author, authorized to institute a nationwide survey of traffic courts by the National Committee on Traffic
Law Enforcement and the National Conference of Judicial Councils, submitted his report in 1940, with fifty-seven
specific recommendations. The report was approved not
only by the sponsors, but by the Section of Criminal Law,
the Section of Judicial Administration, the Junior Bar
Conference, and the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. Subsequently the report was adopted
by the National Safety Council and the International Association of Police Chiefs.
The volume is significant not only because it is based
on a report that has merited the approval of the several
professional bodies functioning in the field of traffic law
enforcement, but also because it is the product of an investigation and study, by questionnaires and field conferences covering the entire country, seeking to ascertain
both what is established by law and what is actually being
done in practice. The author has delved into public relations and political relations in a research which has been
vigorous and thorough.
The first chapter deals with the general problem of
traffic law enforcement, which the author finds is fundamental for the public safety. He reaches the conclusion
that the defendants involved in traffic accidents and violations represent a cross section of our population. The vast
majority of them are otherwise law abiding citizens, and
their experience with our courts is usually limited to the
occasion on which they are summoned for a traffic offense.
It is here they receive the all powerful first impression
of the judicial structure, and it is here that the objective
in traffic law enforcement and the means proposed to accomplish that objective must appeal to the common sense
of the public.
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The subsequent chapters set out clearly the results of
the author's nation-wide investigation. With a few outstanding exceptions, the general method of traffic enforcement presents a situation well calculated to substantiate
the public feeling toward the administration of justice in
the so-called "inferior courts". The evils of the Justice
of the Peace system (happily abolished in Maryland in
1939 by an Act of the Legislature) are thoroughly explained, and the necessity for a higher type of magistrate
and of court personnel is indicated by the fact that for all
intents and purposes the "inferior courts" are courts of
both first and last resort to the average person. Problems such as the "fix", political pressure on the magistrates, and the lack of uniformity in fines and sentences
all receive careful treatment, with conclusions based on
first hand information.
In the chapter devoted to the physical facilities of
traffic courts among other examples cited appears the
following:
"5. A Southeastern City: The room is very dirty.
It has a concrete floor and is located over the pistol
range. During pistol practice every word of the Judge
is punctuated by firearms. The clerk's desk is located
near the bench and the continuous traffic to it over
the concrete makes it extremely difficult for the Judge
to hear testimony or for the defendant to hear the
Judge."
Anyone who has had occasion to be in Part I of the
Traffic Court of Baltimore City, during an afternoon session, will recognize the above description as accurate.
The volume is well documented, and the charts furnished as the basis of interstate comparisons are exceptionally well prepared. The recommendations proposed
by the author are both sound and practical. The appendix
contains the forms of questionnaire used in compiling the
charts, as well as suggested forms to be used in Traffic
Court procedure.
A really adequate index, and an accompanying foreword by the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, former President of the American Bar Association, add to the general
excellence of the book.
ROBERT FRANCE.*
* Of the Baltimore City Bar: Chairman Maryland State Tax Commission; Chief Magistrate, 1939-1943, Traffic Court of Baltimore City.

